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Abstract Port Knocking is a method for authenticat-
ing clients through a closed stance firewall, and autho-
rising their requested actions, enabling severs to offer
services to authenticated clients, without opening ports
on the firewall. Advances in port knocking have re-
sulted in an increase of complexity in design, preventing
port knocking solutions from realising their potential.
This paper proposes a novel port knocking solution,
named Crucible, which is a secure method of authenti-
cation, with high usability and features of stealth, al-
lowing servers and services to remain hidden and pro-
tected. Crucible is a stateless solution, only requiring
the client memorise a command, the server’s IP and a
chosen password. The solution is forwarded as a method
for protecting servers against attacks ranging from port
scans, to zero-day exploitation. To act as a random or-
acle for both client and server, cryptographic hashes
were generated through chaotic systems.
Keywords ZKP · chaos hash · port knocking · random
beacons · attack model
1 Introduction
Port knocking, if integrated into a security environ-
ment, can offer an additional layer of authentication
for servers, furthering a defence-in-depth approach, and
can conceal the presence of services. It is suited to
defending against attacks directed at servers, ranging
from automatic scanning, as part of attack-chain recon-
naissance, to precisely targeted zero-day exploitation.
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Port knocking solutions have progressed and changed
dramatically, since their conception as a simple tool
for opening firewall ports. Many modern port knock-
ing implementations have accumulated layers of com-
plexity in the process of removing specific vulnerabil-
ities from their predecessors. This complexity issue is
further exacerbated by components in port knocking
that are mutually incompatible: replay protection can
result in desynchronisation problems, and interactive
authentication requires the server to forgo its ‘silent’
role. To combat this, many modern port knocking im-
plementations in academic literature take an ad-hoc ap-
proach to fixing existing vulnerabilities without consid-
ering a holistic viewpoint, nor the minimalist lineage
upon which port knocking was founded.
Port knocking can be considered a stealthy method
of authentication and command execution, allowing a
covert channel to exist between a client and server,
across an untrusted network such as the Internet. When
implemented properly, port knocking should be difficult
to discover through passive surveillance of network traf-
fic, or active reconnaissance of the server. Port knock-
ing allows a server to conceal not only its individual
services, but also its role as a server. Numbers Stations
are a Cold War era covert channel using radio broad-
casts of spoken number values (amongst other meth-
ods), suspected to communicate with intelligence assets
in the field [1]. In modern day computing, Meltdown [2]
and Spectre [3] are examples of serious vulnerabilities
enabling covert channels for exfiltrating data from a
victim’s machine.
Port knocking can simply be described as a means
for communicating with a machine that is protected by
a closed-stance firewall. This entails a client machine,
operated by a user, sending a message – or knock – to a
firewall. The firewall in this instance will be referred to
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as the server, for its role in receiving the knock, and the
subsequently authorised actions it performs. This ter-
minology further aims to clarify in situations involving
multiple intermediaries (such as additional firewalls) be-
tween client and server. The networks across which this
transaction can take place could be local, or, as is the
common use case, remote. Port knocking is by design
aimed at operating over untrusted networks, such as
the Internet, wherein malicious actors of varying capa-
bilities aim to subvert security measures. Port knocking
methods generally use cryptographic primitives such as
hash and encryption functions. In the proposed port
knocking method, we have utilised the Chirkov stan-
dard map and absolute chaotic map for the hash that
ensures the output knock is different for each session.
Additionally, the chaos-based hash function provides a
lightweight secure solution and as a result, the proposed
scheme will not require third-party libraries. Moreover,
chaos-based port knocking scheme will have a num-
ber of properties such as sensitivity to initial condi-
tions, non-periodicity, ergodicity, and attack complex-
ity which strengthen the port knocking scheme.
This paper offers three novel port knocking proto-
types: zero knowledge proofs and chaos-based cryptog-
raphy; a combination of chaos-based cryptography and
random beacons; and ‘Crucible’ which is combines ran-
dom beacons and password-based key derivation. Re-
play protection and NAT compatibility are considered
significant issues in port knocking technology. This pa-
per proposes novel approaches for dealing with these
problems.
The rest of paper is organised as follows. Related
work is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses de-
sign and the proposed methodology. Experimental re-
sults are presented in Section 4. The proposed method is
evaluated in Section 5. Research findings are concluded
in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Port knocking allows authentication to a host without
requiring open ports, and without requiring modifica-
tion of the underlying protocol [4]. Furthermore, the
presence of port knocking can be difficult to detect
by sniffing traffic, and almost impossible to detect by
probing a server [5]. By making services ‘invisible’, a
machine’s function as a server can be hidden from an
attacker [6], offering a level of anonymity. Port knock-
ing disrupts attacker reconnaissance by denying finger-
printing efforts against open ports. This prevents auto-
mated and manual scanning efforts, and reduces “ma-
licious information gathering capabilities” [7]. In the
same vein, vulnerability scanning and discovery are im-
peded, and thus port knocking can be considered one of
the few non-reactive defences against zero-day attacks
[8]. In this manner, port knocking can provide protec-
tion for legacy and proprietary services with “insuffi-
cient integrated security”, or for services with “known
unpatched vulnerabilities” [9]. Port knocking also pro-
vides an additional layer of security and authentication,
that any malicious actors must overcome before attack-
ing the hidden service itself [7, 9].
Port knocking can incur load and performance loss
on networks and systems [5], the latter applying an
overhead for each connection [4]. In addition, a num-
ber of ports may need to be “allocated for exclusive
use by port knocking” [10]. Port knocking implementa-
tions may require user training [4] and client systems
need to implement port knocking, which may require
maintenance of dedicated remote client software [7].
Authentication in port knocking is largely facilitated
through pre-shared keys (or other secrets), meaning se-
cure key distribution and management become require-
ments. Port knocking also adds an additional layer of
complexity into the protection of assets [7], and another
attack vector to defend against. The fail-closed stance
of port knocking may result in inaccessibility of ser-
vices, should the authentication mechanism fail on the
server [4, 10]. Such a failure in this mechanism could
render the server “unreachable or more easily compro-
mised” [7].
2.1 Mechanics and Architecture
One of the main differentials when considering port
knocking solutions is the number of packets that are
required to authenticate the client with the server. Tra-
ditional port knocking solutions sent a series of packets
(each knock) across the Internet, where the authenti-
cating data, would be communicated via this collection
of knocks, known as a knock sequence. More recently,
a single packet has been used to wholly and atomi-
cally send authenticating data to the server, in a single
knock, giving rise to the term “Single Packet Authoriza-
tion” [11]. [5] raises an immediate problem with using
multiple packets to authenticate, in that network and
routing issues between the server and the client, such as
latency (from congestion [7]) or packet drops, will cause
the authenticating packets to arrive out of order. If the
knock sequence doesn’t match the server’s expectations,
the client likely won’t be authenticated. [12] offers a so-
lution to this problem by including a sequence number
within each knock’s authenticating data, allowing the
knocks to be reassembled after they are received.
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2.2 Non-Interactive or Interactive Server
While traditionally communications in a port knock-
ing implementation would be limited to unidirectional
client to server messaging, some modern variations con-
versely include server to client communication. This
could also be described as unilateral or bilateral com-
munication. [13] for example, use client server conver-
sations to negotiate a session key, which is then used
to authenticate application data after port knocking
has concluded. [14] includes a lengthy discussion on
this topic. Incorporating challenge and response mech-
anisms into port knocking can be seen to enable fresh
authentication, whereby random challenges are used to
prove the identity of a peer. [12] also reiterates the ad-
vantages of interaction in providing freshness. This ap-
proach avoids the drawbacks of other solutions for re-
play protection, such as requiring time or state-based
synchronisation, as is discussed further in Section 2.4.
[15] implement such a solution, where as proof of iden-
tity, the client is sent an encrypted random number,
which it must decrypt and return, to prove it possesses
the associated pre-shared key, thus authenticating the
client. The authors describe this method as mutual au-
thentication, though it is unclear exactly how the server
is authenticated to the client.
2.3 Multi-Party and Multi-Channel Involvement
More recently, port knocking solutions have been for-
warded that eschew the traditional client-server dynamic,
and opt to include additional parties in the protocol. [5]
sends the client cryptographic information, including a
one time key, and a random number, via an out of band,
dedicated SMS channel. The random number is used to
generate a client-spoofed IP, for preventing client iden-
tification by a listening attacker. The one time key is
used to encrypt the client’s authenticating data, which
is then sent as a port knock to the server. As each knock
attempted in this way is unique, protection against re-
play attacks is provided, with the added bonus of mak-
ing the port knocking traffic difficult for an attacker to
identify. [16] uses a similar approach, where SMS is in-
stead used to deliver information from which IPSec tun-
nel keys are derived, and used to setup a secure channel
between the client and server. [4] enforce time synchro-
nisation between client and server by having them issue
NTP requests ahead of a knock, and on startup, respec-
tively. Maintaining accurate timing allows the time-
based authentication to be more granular, reducing the
window of opportunity for replay attacks.
2.4 Replay Protection
A port knock authenticates the client to a server, typi-
cally by proving the client possesses a secret, such as a
key or password. In proving this over the wire, encryp-
tion or hashing are employed to prevent eavesdroppers
from learning the secret. An adversary listening to com-
munications between the knocking client and listening
server could record a knock and replay it back to the
server in order to repeat its intended effect. Such at-
tacks have been cited as the main vulnerability affecting
basic port knocking implementations [7]. These attacks
are prevented by ensuring that each time a port knock
is executed, the authenticating data is unique, or fresh,
and further ensuring that an attacker is unable to gen-
erate a fresh knock. Many of the techniques used to
achieve freshness carry similarities with one time pass-
word (OTP) protocols [17].
3 Design and Methodology
3.1 Zero Knowledge
A zero knowledge proof (ZKP) is a cryptographic pro-
tocol allowing one to prove they posses information to a
verifying party, without revealing any of the underlying
information itself [18]. Alternatively defined by [19], a
ZKP shows “a statement to be true without revealing
anything other than the veracity of the statement to be
proven”.
As a real-world example (modified from [20]), to
prove someone could distinguish between two different
types of wine, a number of blind-tests could be per-
formed until the claim was proven or refuted. If the
claimant identified the wine correctly each time, the
verifier can be reasonably sure of the claimant’s distin-
guishing ability, without themselves learning the dif-
ference between the vintages. In a similar vein, if af-
ter being repeatedly being sent into the labyrinth as a
sacrificial offering for the Minotaur, a single Athenian
continued to escape, one could be reasonably certain
the citizen knew how to escape, though one would not
be able to discern the citizen’s method. These are not
perfect examples, but demonstrate the general idea.
Zero knowledge proofs harness difficult mathemat-
ical problems to provide security against information
leakage from the proof – the ‘zero knowledge’ property.
These difficult mathematical problems can be seen in
RSA, for large integer factorisation, and Diffie-Hellman,
relating to the discrete logarithm problem. One-way (or
trapdoor) functions are the embodiment of these math-
ematical problems, a function that is relatively easy to
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compute, but computationally infeasible to reverse [21],
also referred to as a quality of intractability.
Zero knowledge protocols are classically “instances
of interactive proof systems, wherein a prover and a
verifier exchange multiple messages (challenges and re-
sponses)” [22], though there are a subset of ZKP where
this interactivity is removed, reducing the number of
rounds needed to establish and verify the proof. These
‘rounds’ are akin to each wine tasting, or labyrinth es-
cape, in the previous examples. A non-interactive zero
knowledge proof (NIZKP) allows the prover to publish
a proof, in a single communication, that can be openly
verified by anyone [18].
In the ‘proof’ component of a ZKP, the prover as-
serts a verifiable claim. One such strategy is where a
proof of knowledge is made by the prover, examples
of this are seen in the previous review of port knock-
ing mechanics: pre-image resistance of a cryptographic
hash could imply proof of knowledge of the digested se-
cret, proof of decryption could be considered proof of
knowledge of the decryption key. Related is the concept
of proof of identity, where a “person’s identity can be
linked to his ability to do something and in particular to
his ability to prove knowledge of some sort” [20]. Iden-
tification is a natural application for proofs of knowl-
edge [23] and as such, a proof of knowledge protocol
can be used to authenticate [24]. For example, a user
could prove they know a password, without revealing
any information about the password itself, to any par-
ties privy to the conversation.
3.1.1 Identification Protocols
To harness the capabilities of zero knowledge proofs
for the client (or prover) authenticating with the port
knocking server, an identification protocol sets out the
framework for what is required of each party, how val-
ues are calculated and which values are sent as mes-
sages. Identification protocols based around zero knowl-
edge proofs are examined in depth in [18] and [22],
both works explore the protocols of Feige-Fiat-Shamir,
Guillou-Quisquater and Schnorr:
– Feige-Fiat-Shamir The protocol uses the difficulty
of extracting square roots modulo a large compos-
ite integer [22]. FFS requires a variable number of
rounds (depending on desired security level), each
requiring 3 messages [18].
– Guillou-Quisquater GQ uses the difficulty of ex-
tracting roots of a higher order [22]. GQ can be run
in multiple rounds, or a single, and uses 3 messages
per round [18]. GQ, at the cost of greater computa-
tion than FSS, minimises the number of interactions
required, and is comprised of short, simple mathe-
matical mechanics [18].
– Schnorr The Schnorr Identification Scheme har-
nesses the difficulty of computing discrete logs in
a prime field [22]. Like GQ, Schnorr’s solution uses
simple mechanics (shown in Protocol 1, please see
Appendix). The protocol uses 3 messages and one
round [22]. Schnorr’s has relatively low computa-
tional complexity and supports precomputation of
some values [25].
The design goal of using only a single packet for
authentication in the port knocking solution is at odds
with the interactivity of the three identification pro-
tocols; specifically each requires (at least) three mes-
sages. [24] also notes “a large number of interactions
means a poor performance in both communication and
in computation”. Thankfully, a solution to this prob-
lem is outlined in RFC 8235: “Schnorr Non-interactive
Zero-Knowledge Proof” [26]. This RFC will form the
reference basis for the remainder of this section.
3.1.2 RFC 8235
The Fiat-Shamir Transformation is a method for trans-
forming a three-message zero knowledge proof of iden-
tity into a single message equivalent protocol. This is
achieved by introducing a cryptographic hash of par-
ticular variables, in lieu of the random challenge that
is issued by the verifier (message 2). As outlined in the
RFC, this can be used to convert Schnorr’s scheme into
a non-interactive zero knowledge proof, as seen in Pro-
tocol 2.
3.1.3 Discussion
Protocol 2 (please see Appendix) will be harnessed as
a method for authentication, used during prototyping
in the following subsection. Considering its actions as a
black-box, where randomness, a private key and shared
parameters are input, the result is a proof which will
be sent over the wire to be received and validated by
the port knocking server. The protocol requires a secure
cryptographic hash and this will form the discussion in
the following section.
3.2 Chaos
[27] draws exact links between properties of chaotic and
cryptographic systems. As seen in Table 1, Shannon’s
descriptions of simple operations, of sensitivity to initial
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variable changes, and of a complex output, for strong
cryptographic primitives, largely correspond with be-
haviours in chaotic systems. The process for mixing
pastry dough used as a metaphor by Shannon and Hopf
actually forms the basis of a well studied chaotic sys-
tem, known as the Baker’s map [28].
To help illustrate the key terms in Table 1, the fol-
lowing definitions are included:
– diffusion: the spreading out of the influence of the
function input over many bits of the function out-
put [29]. For example, a single plaintext bit being
distributed over the ciphertext output.
– confusion: the use of transformations to obscure the
the statistical dependencies between function input
and output [29]
Lastly, it is important to clarify between some of the
key terms introduced, particularly to delineate between
the concepts of chaos and randomness. Truly random
behaviour is non-deterministic, even if a random system
is fully understood, predicting its outcome at a given fu-
ture state is impossible [30]. Chaotic behaviour, in com-
parison, is deterministic, and every future state in the
system is determined by its prior initialisation [30]. In
applied cryptography, both pseudo-random and chaotic
systems are deterministic, and used for their qualities
of being computationally unpredictable, meaning that
guessing the previous state of the system (e.g. the in-
puts to a cryptographic primitive) is computationally
infeasible [29, 30]. This is similar to how hard mathe-
matical problems were used to hide secret information
in zero knowledge proofs.
3.2.1 Chaotic Systems
Chaotic systems are often result from mathematical
functions, or maps, such as the Ikeda map and the
Chirikov standard map. Mathematically, Chirikov stan-
dard map is written as:
{
pn+1 = pn +K sin θn mod 2pi
θn+1 = θn + pn+1 mod 2pi
(1)
where K is control paramter, pn and θn are real values
between (0, 2pi). Each increment of n reflects an itera-
tion of the map, much like how a hash function or ZKP
uses a number of rounds [29]. The map represents a dy-
namical mechanical system, where the dimensions θ and
p are used practically to represent position and momen-
tum, though the important note here is that variables
take on new values, on each iteration of the map, re-
sulting in a new θp-coordinate. The constant coefficient
K influences the degree of chaos exhibited by the map.
3.2.2 Chaos-Based Cryptographic Hashes
Chaotic cryptography is an active research area, pro-
ducing real-world applications including cryptographic
primitives such as pseudorandom number generators
(PRNG), encryption systems (both symmetric and asym-
metric), and hash functions [31]. Chaotic maps and
hash functions have similar characteristics [32], as ex-
plored previously in Table 1, and a number of cryp-
tographic hash functions have been created harnessing
chaotic systems.
For a formal definition, a hash function takes a mes-
sage input, of arbitrary length, and calculates a fixed
length output, known as the hash value, or a digest.
This value is used to identify the input, acting as a
fingerprint. There are a number of required properties
for a hash function to be considered cryptographically
secure, including:
– Preimage Resistance - given a random hash value,
an attacker should never be able to find the preim-
age associated with the value [33]. This is why hash
functions are considered as one-way functions – a
message cannot be derived from a digest [34].
– Second-Preimage Resistance - given a message M1,
with hash value H(M1), an attacker should never
be able to find M2 such that H(M1) = H(M2) [33].
– Collision Resistance - it should be computationally
infeasible to find two (or more) different messages
that hash to the same value [33].
Returning to the components being researched for
prototyping, a secure cryptographic hash function is re-
quired for use in Schnorr’s NIZKP. From the design
goals, this ideally will be lightweight, simple, and should
not require the use of third-party libraries.
3.2.3 Absolute-Value Chaotic Hash Function
The chaotic hash function proposed by [35] forms the
reference basis for the remainder of this section. This
implementation of a chaos-based hash function was cho-
sen for a number of reasons:
– The chaotic map and design of the function is sim-
ple, using mostly basic mathematics, and the au-
thors have provided pseudo-code of the algorithms
involved.
– The authors have evaluated the hash using both
chaotic metrics, and metrics required of secure cryp-
tographic hashes. This includes:
– Assurance that sensitivity to initial conditions is
reflected in the hashing process.
– Statistical analysis of confusion, diffusion.
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Table 1: Table comparing chaotic and cryptographic properties, modified from [27].
Chaotic Property Cryptographic Property Description
Ergodicity Confusion The output has the same distribution for
any input
Sensitivity to initial conditions/ control
parameter
Diffusion from a small change in plain-
text/key
A small input deviation can largely change
the output
Mixing property Diffusion from a single plaintext block A small local deviation can largely change
the whole space
Deterministic dynamics Deterministic pseudo-randomness A deterministic process can cause a
random-like behaviour
Structure complexity Algorithmic complexity A simple algorithm has a very high com-
plexity
– Comparative testing of the statistical analysis
against other hash functions, including other pro-
posed chaotic hash functions, and against popu-
lar hash functions MD5 and SHA-1.
The hash function is keyed, meaning it falls into a
category of cryptographic hashes that require a key and
a message to produce the digest output. Like regular
hashes, keyed variants can ensure the integrity of a mes-
sage, though this is extended further to provide authen-
tication (by use of a key) for the message. In Ref [36],
authors have utilised chaotic map i.e., Chebyshev for
broadcast authentication and chaos-based hashing. All
broadcast messages were authenticated via chaos maps.
A keyed hash has two main requirements to be cryp-
tographically secure [34]: an attacker must not be able
to forge a valid digest from a message without the key,
and secondly an attacker must not be able to recover
the key from message digests [34]. The hash function
harnesses use of an absolute value chaotic map given
by:
xn+1 = 1−ABS(αxn) (2)
Equation 2 produces a series of values that chaot-
ically vary when α is chosen to reside in the interval
1 < α < 2. The bifurcation diagram shown in Fig.
1 highlights the range of α which can be used as a
key parameter for chaotic region. From the Fig. 1, it
is clear why one should use the interval 1 < α < 2
when random data is required. The authors’ provided
pseudo-code outlines how this chaotic map is converted
into a hash function, which is summarised in Protocol
3 (please see Appendix).
3.2.4 Discussion
To convert Schnorr’s Identification Protocol (Protocol
1, please see Appendix) into a non-interactive zero knowl-
edge proof, a hash function is required, to act as a ran-
dom oracle for both client and server. Schnorr’s NIZKP,
in Protocol 2, now has its required hash function. Us-
ing only mathematical operations, this hash function
should require few library imports, and therefore should
be fairly platform agnostic. It’s keyed mode of opera-
tion will be further used to authenticate messages from
client to server.
3.3 Random Beacons
As discussed in Section 2.4, unique knock values are
required to prevent an attacker re-sending a previous
knock, to replay a previously authorised action. As port
knocking solutions typically use cryptographic primi-
tives such as hash and encryption functions, a random
number is often added to the functions’ inputs, ensuring
that the output knock value is different for each session.
This random value can be derived from methods such
as iterative hashing, synchronised time clocks, or using
counters. These methods require that both client and
server have a way of reaching the same random value,
i.e. it is shared between the two. Schnorr’s NIZKP, as
explored in Section 3.1.2 does not suffer this problem:
the random value is client generated, and included in
each knock, and checked by the server on arrival. Set-
ting Schnorr’s NIZKP aside for now, the design goals
explicitly prevent using client state, so an alternative
replay prevention mechanism is desired.
[37] introduced the idea of a random beacon, an
online security service emitting a random integer at
regular intervals, for public consumption, with appli-
cations in cryptographic protocols requiring trusted,
shared random number access. To introduce notation,
the beacon broadcasts a nonce value (a number used
once), to any satellite clients, who optionally may fur-
ther process the broadcast through extractor functions.
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Fig. 1: Plot of Bifurcation diagram showing the chaotic region for α parameter.
Formally, a list of requirements for a beacon service is
provided by [38]:
– unpredictable: an adversary should not be able to
predict any information about the nonce prior to
its broadcast
– unbiased: the nonce should be statistically close to
uniform, random information
– universally sampleable: any satellite client should be
able to harvest (or extract) the nonce
– universally verifiable: the beacon can be verified to
be unknown to any party prior to its broadcast
3.3.1 Sources of Randomness
A number of solutions are present in the literature for
random beacons. [39] suggests that Network Time Pro-
tocol (NTP) can be used as a beacon. As an example,
the hash of an NTP received time-stamp (within a safe
margin of precision) could produce a pseudo-random
nonce. This is similar to the port knocking implemen-
tation explored in Section 2.4, where clock synchroni-
sation can be considered a shared state between client
and server. Again, to avoid synchronisation issues be-
tween port knocking client and server, per the design
goals, this is not an applicable solution for the proto-
type. Furthermore the time-measurements issued by an
NTP service are likely unverifiable.
[40] propose using the price of publicly listed finan-
cial instruments, taken at closing time, as a source of
random data. The authors note this approach has pre-
viously been used in cases including committee nom-
ination, proof of work cryptographic puzzles, and in
two public elections within North America. The pro-
posed solution collects closing prices from a number of
stocks and uses a extractor function (with elements of
a PRNG) to harvest quantifiable entropy results from
the financial beacons. [41] also provide an implementa-
tion using stock indices as random beacons. Their paper
details considerations on particular stocks to harvest,
which exchanges to use and associated timezone fac-
tors. Both papers note that there are historic examples
of price manipulation in financial markets, a method
by which the security of the random beacon could be
adversely affected by a malicious actor. Such a scenario
would constitute a breach of the unpredictability prop-
erty of the random beacon. [41] suggest a greater prob-
lem may be posed by trusting the price reporting web-
site (e.g. Bloomberg) to accurately reflect market val-
ues. [38] highlights that limited market opening hours
will result in lack of beacon availability.
[42] discusses the newly introduced NIST random
beacon, a public service providing a 512-bit nonce, ev-
ery minute, of true-random data, generated using “quan-
tum mechanical phenomena”. This sounds ideally suited
for the purpose, however, the authors note that while
the service is extensively documented, there is no as-
surance to consumers that the numbers are generated
as advertised. Simply put, again, the beacon is unverifi-
able. [38] treats NIST’s reputation as a trusted party in
this context with a heavy dose of scepticism, alluding
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to the discovery of a backdoor in the NIST-published
Dual_EC_DRBG cryptographic standard.
Relating back to the beacon requirements, these so-
lutions are all predominantly unverifiable, and as a re-
sult, can’t be provably unpredictable, a desired quality.
To address this problem, a number of different beacons
can be used, where their results are combined or eval-
uated in a fashion that reduces the likelihood of tam-
pering. Some of the methods used to tackle dishonest
beacons include:
XOR nonces [43]: in this solution each beacon ser-
vice is polled, and the resulting nonces are XOR’ed
together. If the beacon sources are incapable of in-
fluencing each other (perhaps they can’t witness
each other’s broadcasts), then this method does re-
duce the effectiveness of tampering, by making the
outcome more unpredictable. However, if the bea-
cons are capable of influencing each other, the au-
thors note that the last beacon to be polled could
calculate the penultimate XOR result and alter its
broadcast accordingly to influence the final outcome.
In such a scenario, the solution is ineffective and re-
dundant.
Round-robin nonces [43]: this solution (also dis-
cussed in [44]) simply rotates which sources are used
by using each beacon for a fixed time-period, before
moving onto the next. Unpredicability of the out-
come is proportional to the ratio of dishonest bea-
cons in the pool, meaning if at least one beacon is
honest, then the round-robin approach does indeed
makes the overall outcome more unpredictable. Un-
fortunately, this would require a shared state be-
tween the client and server, namely the position of
the round, disagreeing with the design goals.
Hashing nonces [43]: the collection of nonces from
different beacons could be hashed in some manner,
the authors suggest that a hash of the concatenation
of each nonce could be taken. The authors then ar-
gue, an adversary with a large amount of computing
power at their disposal could use brute-force tech-
niques to find preimages of the hash function with
certain qualities (e.g. H(m) starts with ’00’) result-
ing in the compromise of the other nonces in the
pool. For these reasons, hashing nonces is consid-
ered by the authors as equal or less secure than the
XOR strategy.
Delayed evaluation [45]: as discussed previously,
a dishonest beacon can alter its nonce in an attempt
to influence the other nonces it is combined with, to
try and influence the final outcome. Variable delay
functions (VDF) are processes designed to strategi-
cally slow down calculation of some task, and hence
can be used to slow down the process of evaluating
the pool of nonces. If for example, two independent
beacons publish nonces in an hourly window, the de-
lay function could be set to prolong the time it takes
to combine these nonces. If the delay was set to a
long enough period, neither beacon would have the
time to derive a malicious nonce, before the hourly
window had transpired and new nonce values were
expected to be broadcast. [42] contains further dis-
cussion on VDFs and their applications.
These anti-tampering methods provide options for
combining multiple random beacons, where the issue
with trusting an single-source provider of random data
appears to largely concern how predictability can be
avoided, given that solutions are largely unverifiable,
and could be tampered with. The proceeding section
covers the random beacon chosen for the prototype,
that is transparent, distributed, an accordingly conveys
a higher degree of trust. It is worth noting however, that
preferably if the literature had provided a suitable alter-
native, applicable to the design goals for the prototype,
the combination of multiple random beacons would be
the preferred option, as discussed in the evaluation.
3.3.2 Bitcoin Random Beacon
Blockchains are distributed, immutable ledgers of trans-
actions used to record and authenticate activities of in-
volved parties. Bitcoin is one such instance of blockchain
technology known as a cryptocurrency, offering openly
decentralised, self-governed currency transactions, backed
by secure cryptographic protocols. Bitcoin transactions
are collected into blocks, where within each block a
Merkle Root is calculated and recorded in the block
header. The Merkle Root involves hashing each trans-
action in the block in a manner that ensures that the
entire contents of the block, including its ordering, is
recorded to protect the integrity of the block’s contents.
Once a block is filled with transactions, the hash of the
previous block on the chain is added into its header,
forming the ‘chain’ of collections of transactions, where
each link ensures the integrity of its predecessor. [46]
The job of calculating the latest block on the chain is
tasked to miners, who are rewarded with Bitcoin cur-
rency for their efforts. Alongside the aforementioned
hashing calculations, miners must also solve a proof of
work puzzle for each new block – the block’s hash digest
must begin with a number of zeroes – a task requir-
ing millions of hash calculations. If multiple chains are
broadcast to the Bitcoin network the longest is chosen,
meaning it has been created with the most work, and
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therefore is the consensus reached by the mining com-
munity. This ensures that in order to tamper with the
blockchain, an attacker would require computational
power surpassing the rest of the mining community. [46]
The chosen random beacon for the prototype is taken
from [38], which forms the reference source for the re-
mainder of this section. The paper proposes that the
random values resulting from proof of work computa-
tions in the Bitcoin network make each new block mined
on the network a suitable random beacon (please see
Protocol 4, Appendix).
4 Experimentation
4.1 Prototype I: ZKP and Chaos
The first prototype introduced here combines the work
of Schnorr’s Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proof (NIZKP)
and the Chaos-based Keyed Hash Function, from 3.1
and 3.2 in the preceding subsection. Prototype I will
display a large amount of the general structure ahead
of its successors.
4.1.1 Setup
The setup of a client and server is the only out-of-band
process, used to derive the secrets and configurations
required for port knocking operations. The subroutine
achieving this, produces a profile JSON file each for
client and server, housing cryptograhic parameters and
configuration settings. The profile contents include:
– Schnorr NIZKP parameters (refer to Section 3.1.2)
– Group parameters p, q, g are generated using a
call to the openssl library. Specifically this uses
the dsaparam module, to generate DSA parame-
ters, which are applicable for the NIZKP as out-
lined in [26]. DSA key-length is set to 2048-bit.
– Private key a is randomly selected from the range
[0, q−1] and is used to derive public key A ≡ ga.
Note: the only difference between the client and
server profiles generated is the absence of a in
the server profile, as the ZKP proves knowledge
of a.
– 8-bit command ID - for future development to
support multiple commands under a single pro-
file. In the original protocol, these were refered
to as UserID, and OtherInfo.
– Private hash key: a float number in the range (−1, 1),
with 256-bit precision, for an associated 256-bit keyspace.
Implemented using the mpmath 3rd party Python li-
brary.
– Server port number: randomly generated during setup,
and fixed throughout all exchanges.
– Command: user specified shell command to run upon
successful client authentication.
On a modern laptop, generation of the profiles was
near instantaneous, and each was sized at 3KB. The
profiles should be securely transferred and housed on
the client and server machines.
4.1.2 Chaos-based Hash Function
The hash digest length was increased to 256-bit, as was
required by RFC 8235 [26] for compatability with the
NIZKP: “The bit length of the hash output should be
at least equal to that of the order q of the consid-
ered subgroup.” This level of precision necessitated that
the mpmath library be used, above the standard float
data types that ship with Python. The horsepower re-
quired to manage calculations with these floats, with
up to log(2256)/log(10) ≈ 78 decimal places, had a dra-
matic affect on the hashing speeds, with the hash taking
over 20 seconds to calculate the required digest for the
NIZKP protocol. Issues with chaotic map computations
of floating point numbers were noted by [32], though
were not expected to be this severe. A large factor
in the sluggishness of the hash function was the num-
ber of iterations to perform, or in terms of the chaotic
map, the time parameter t. From the authors’ paper,
little guidance was set for how to select this parameter,
t = 10000 was one such baseline used for testing, how-
ever this proved unachievable in practical time. A fur-
ther factor in this speed is undoubtedly increasing the
hash’s bit length. Lastly, as the hash was implemented
in Python, a high-level language, time savings could
further be gained by implementing the final version of
the port knocking application in a language closer to
the client hardware.
4.1.3 Client Actions
In Schnorr’s NIZKP, a hash is taken of the public key
A, the random walk V ≡ gv, where v is randomly gener-
ated by the client, and other, non-essential parameters.
The resulting digest c, accompanied by r ≡ v−ac, form
the proof of knowledge, or knock in this case, as the pair
of concatenated values c||r, that are then transmitted
to the port knocking server in the payload of a UDP
datagram.
UDP was chosen as the transport protocol for send-
ing the values, as TCP connection-based overhead and
interactivity were not deemed necessary nor applicable,
respectively, to minimalist design goals. ICMP traffic
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could be an alternative, though nothing was found in
the literature to support this approach, whereas [12],
[47], [48] provide justifications for choosing UDP. Python’s
native socket library was used to send the knock packet,
where the server IP and destination port values are both
taken from the client profile, the former being user in-
put from stdin, and the latter being randomly gener-
ated.
4.1.4 Server Actions
The server parses traffic using scapy, a 3rd party Python
library that provides an interface to lower-level libpcap
functionality. The open-source libpcap library for net-
work traffic capture operates on Linux systems, allow-
ing packets to be inspected before firewall rules [7],
and is “among the most widely used [APIs] for net-
work packet capture”. Scapy is used to continually sniff
the server’s network interface. Collected traffic is then
subjected to conditional rulesets designed to filter out
traffic not meeting ZKP criteria:
1. Traffic must be destined for the server port, as setup
in the client profile.
2. Traffic must be UDP, with an integer payload.
3. The payload is of length equal to the hash digest
length, plus an integer r mod q, padded with zeroes
to fix this length.
If a packet is sniffed meeting these criteria, then
the Schnorr NIZKP Protocol (see 3.1.2) outlines the
mathematical checks performed to validate the proof,
computationally, this involves:
1. Calculate c, v, by splitting the packet payload into
their appropriate lengths.
2. Calculate V ≡ grAc using values from Step 1, and
the client profile.
3. Check whether the received c is equal to:
H (V ‖A‖CommandID)
If the proof is successful, the client is authenticated,
and their requested shell command is executed. Though
not implemented, the protocol allows for accompanying
the proof with further data, this could be used to facil-
itate multiple command options for a single client, and
multiple users.
4.1.5 Discussion
Prototype I, uses third party libraries only for floating-
point computations, and packet sniffing from the wire.
Theoretically, a powerful pocket calculator could gen-
erate the proof required to authenticate, and it could
be sent via any number of on-line services for testing
network connectivity. It could be argued that reducing
dependencies such as 3rd party libraries use will reduce
threat vectors from exploitation of those libraries. The
prototype is further well suited for application on de-
vices with limited ability to maintain updated libraries.
Replay protection is a corollary of mixing randomly
chosen v, and resulting V , in some form, into c and
r, ensuring each time a knock is sent, each element in
the proof is derived from a nonce.
Returning to the design goals, the aim of having the
server precompute acceptable knock values is entirely
missed. Instead, this prototype requires the server to
check a potential client proof, requiring two exponenti-
ation operations in the group setting [26], and a hash
function execution. This opens a serious attack vector:
by sending data to a suspected port knocking service
port, an attacker can force the server to perform com-
putations, potentially blocking out valid client knocks.
As per [49], “processing required to verify the [knock]
should be minimal and not introduce a [DoS] vector.”.
Filtering options are limited for preventing such at-
tacks, as knock values are pseudo-random, possessing
no identifiable characteristics other than length, con-
tradicting goals from [49]: “unauthorized packets should
be rejected as early as possible to reduce attack surface
and decrease server side processing.”
To combat this, a traffic rate limiter could be en-
forced (the scapy sniffer offers such a feature) though
this could in turn enable an attacker to purposely trig-
ger the rate limiter to block out legitimate clients. Al-
ternatively, the server’s sniffer could establish a sort of
reputational filter, ignoring the traffic from IPs that
have sent invalid knocks, though this could be circum-
vented if the attacker spoofed their IP. Hopefully these
scenarios illustrate why both the only precomputation
and only key-based authentication were included as de-
sign goals. Suffice to say, this prototype does not fare
well against denial of service attacks. DoS mitigation
could be supplied by network and host monitoring solu-
tions, such as IDPS, though this should not be required
of a port knocking implementation.
4.2 Prototype II: Chaos and Random Beacons
The second prototype explored in this subsection for-
goes zero knowledge proofs, and instead adopts a ran-
dom beacon service, as described in 3.3. The chaos-
based hash functionality is further retained, though this
time it is used to parse the random beacon. The client
and server profiles are setup as previously, though with-
out the parameters for Schnorr’s NIZKP. Largely, the
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code is replicated from the previous prototype, with
modifications outlined in the following.
4.2.1 Blockchain-based Random Beacon
The Bitcoin random beacon protocol, as shown in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, pulls information from a website providing
updates on Bitcoin’s blockchain. The Python code for
implementing this feature is taken from [50], with small
changes, including a change of website to the blockchain
API provided by [51], which for this purpose requires
only a single HTTPS GET request using the Python na-
tive request library, to a URL of the website’s blockchain
API. This API replies, offering information on the lat-
est published block in JSON format. From there, the
block header, and block header hash, are extracted and
combined through a pairwise OR. The resulting string is
then passed through the chaos-based keyed hash func-
tion, resulting in a 256-bit beacon value. Of note, if the
hash function used were not keyed, then the attacker
would be able to recreate the beacon output. Given that
the key used in the hash function is only available to
client and server, as per Protocol I’s setup, this means
the beacon values are shared, random and private. The
keyed hash function could be used to combine multiple
random beacons, for greater security (see Section 3.3.1,
though this is beyond the scope of the demonstration
here.
After a new beacon has just been received, the bea-
con service sleeps for a fixed number of minutes, which
can be changed to preference in accordance with block
production speeds varying roughly around the 1 per 10
minutes mark [38]. Following this wait, the beacon will
check more frequently, until the data pulled from the
API differs, signalling a recalculation of the knock to
expect from a client.
4.2.2 Client Operations
For this prototype, the UDP knock payload is defined
as Hk(beacon||command), where k and H are the key
and chaos-based hash implemented in the previous pro-
totype. As discussed in the port knocking mechanisms
literature review, hashes are one way functions that can
provide a proof of identity: the attacker can only gen-
erate this payload if they are privy to the secret key,
which is securely shared in out of band setup. Replay
protection in this instance is provided by the freshness
derived from the beacon. After processing, the beacon’s
values are pseudo-random, so the only instance in which
the hash function receives two identical messages would
be where the blockchain API reports an identical block
and block hash. Therefore, the only instance in which
a knock-collision occurs would result from either this
scenario, or a weakness in the hash function. The se-
curity level resulting from a 256-bit keyspace for the
chaos-based hash function ensures this is unlikely. Once
constructed, the UDP payload is sent out as previously.
4.2.3 Server Operations
The port knocking server’s operations include period-
ically harvesting random beacon data, converting this
data into the knock it expects to see from the client, and
monitoring the network to detect whether this knock
has been received. These responsibilities require a de-
gree of concurrency, for example the server must re-
tain its listening abilities whilst at the same time cal-
culating what the proceeding knock should look like,
which uses the overwhelmingly slow chaos-based hash
function. To handle these tasks in parallel, the native
Python multiprocessing library is used to setup indi-
vidual processes for traffic monitoring, beacon harvest-
ing, and authorised command handling. Special vari-
ables handled by a multiprocessing Manager are shared
between the processes, for instance to signal that the
client has successfully authenticated.
4.2.4 Discussion
Once a beacon has been harvested and processed, the
server is left with a string value to listen for on the
network, which if found, signals authentication, and
subsequently the user’s command is authorised. To en-
able multiple commands, a new Hk(beacon||command)
is calculated for each, per beacon, and accordingly lis-
tened for. In comparison with the first protocol, and in
the context of the design goals, this variant is vastly
more simple, and has managed to eschew the denial
of service attack vectors the latter was vulnerable to.
Where previously the server performed exponential cal-
culations and hashing operations to verify the authen-
ticating data, this prototype need only check whether
strings are equal. By removing the Schnorr framework,
only a single private key is required (for the keyed hash),
and the openssl library can be forgone. The introduc-
tion of a trusted third party (the blockchain API), is
an obvious security detractor. Further examination of
this aspect will follow later, in the evaluation section.
4.3 Prototype III: Crucible
The final prototype introduced by this paper differs
largely from the previous iterations. As a consequence
of research leading up to this section, Prototype III,
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henceforth named Crucible (a namesake derived from
its blending of ideas, much like elements in a furnace)
draws its motivations from zero knowledge proofs, and
chaos-based cryptography, but instead replaces both
previously implemented components with dedicated off-
the-shelf, cryptographic alternatives, that are already
established in practice.
For authentication purposes, the previous review of
zero knowledge proofs aimed to lead development to-
wards a practical proof of identity scheme which could
be used to prove knowledge of a secret key. Crucible
pursues this line of thinking, but instead uses a pass-
word based key derivation function (PBKDF) to prove
knowledge of a password. In doing so, the server does
not possess the password itself, only its hash. In both
previous prototypes, the run-time of the chaos-based
keyed hash severely dampened results, instead, in Cru-
cible, it will be replaced with a modern keyed hash al-
ternative.
4.3.1 Password Based Key Derivation
A key derivation function converts a secret value (such
as a master key, passphrase, or password) into a se-
cure cryptographic key [34]. Password based key deriva-
tion functions (PBKDF) are the family of such solu-
tions aimed at converting potentially weak user sup-
plied passwords into a keys that are specifically de-
signed to be resistant to cracking attempts, making
them well suited for storing user credentials on a server,
whilst limiting the exposure to users if that server were
to be compromised [52].
As from the discussion on what comprises a secure
cryptographic hash in Section 3.2.2, a PBKDF requires
all the qualities of preimage, second-preimage, and col-
lision resistance. In addition to this, a PBKDF needs
resistance to lookup table attacks (e.g. rainbow tables),
CPU-optimised cracking, hardware-optimised cracking
(e.g. GPUs, FPGAs and ASICs), amongst other crite-
ria, as established by the 2015 Password Hashing Com-
petition [52]. Argon2 was the winner of this competi-
tion, and is selected for purpose in Crucible. Further
details on Argon2 can be found in the IETF draft [53]
and design paper [54].
The prototype uses Python’s native passlib library,
updated with installation of the Argon2 package. This
specifically uses the Argon2i variation, recommended
for password hashing purposes, as opposed to other
KDF operations [53]. The hash parameters chosen for
this prototype set Argon2 to use 20 rounds, 256MB
ram, and 2 threads of parallelism, producing a hash in
under 2 seconds on a modern laptop. Salt is set to a
fixed value (explained later in Section 5.1.3), and with
the chosen parameters is stored alongside the digest, in
a single hash string. These settings should be chosen in
implementation to maximise computation efforts under
the used hardware environment.
The setup process is similar to the preceding pro-
totypes, where instead Argon2 replaces key generation
procedures: the user is asked to input their chosen pass-
word (which they are to memorise), the hash of which
is then stored only on the port knocking server. In addi-
tion to memorising the password, with Crucible the user
needs to know only the IP address on which to knock,
and the command name to execute. In this manner,
Crucible is stateless, whereby a user can download the
client application, and perform port knocking, without
needing access to secret keys or other parameters, i.e.
following installation of a profile on the server, a client
profile (as per previous prototypes) is not required.
4.3.2 Keyed Hash
With the client able to derive a key from their chosen
password, Crucible follows Prototype II in using a keyed
hash to digest a random beacon. In preference of the
chaos-based keyed hash already explored previously, an
established hash function is taken from the literature.
BLAKE2 was chosen to perform the task of hashing
operations in Crucible, being among the fastest secure
hash functions available, and the most-popular non-
NIST standard hash [34]. Unlike alternatives Siphash,
and SHA3, BLAKE2 is resistant to side-channel at-
tacks, where an attacker has access to RAM and regis-
ters [34]. Further, unlike SHA3, BLAKE2 has native
support for keyed mode hashing, without additional
construction. More information on BLAKE2 can be found
in [55].
The particular variant BLAKE2b, was chosen for
64-bit optimisation in the test environment. The pyblake2
3rd party Python library [56] was used for the Python
2.7 implementation (referenced on the authors’ website
[57]), however the native hashlib supports BLAKE2
for later versions.
4.3.3 Setup
Ahead of port knocking operations, the client must gen-
erate a profile to leave with the server, used by the
server to know which knocks to listen for. The gener-
ation process firstly prompts the user for a password,
and the user is then directed to submit a number of
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commands for the server to execute on successful au-
thentication. Each command must be named, and along
with the password and IP of the server, each command
name must be memorised. Following this, per the pre-
vious prototypes, the client profile is serialised in JSON
and saved in a text file, to remain with the server.
4.3.4 Client Operations
To execute a command on the port knocking server,
a remote user runs the client Python script, and the
following operations are performed:
1. The client supplied password is run through Argon2
to generate the associated key:
key = Argon2b(password).
2. The client script pulls down and calculates the most
recent random beacon from the blockchain API.
3. The beacon and client supplied command are con-
catenated, and hashed with BLAKE2, using a keyed
mode of operation:
knock = BLAKE2bkey(beacon||command)
4. The server’s port number listening to the knocks is
derived similarly to the the key, though instead the
command is replaced with “0”. The first two bytes of
the resulting hash are then converted into an integer
port number, this combined with the IP provide the
destination to which the knock is sent.
The key, beacon, and knock at i are calculated as:
key = Argon2i (password) ,
beacon = BLAKE2bkey (blockHeader+ blockHeaderHash) , knocki = BLAKE2bkey (beacon||commandi)
where i represents the chosen command for the par-
ticular knock session (the server will listen for all pos-
sible values of i).
4.3.5 Server Operations
The structure for the server operations is largely simi-
lar to Prototype II: there are a number of interrelated
tasks the server needs to perform concurrently, man-
aged through Python’s multiprocessing library:
– The server periodically checks the blockchain API
for new values, and stores harvested beacons in a
multiprocessing Manager dictionary, to enable ac-
cess by other processes. Once a new beacon is har-
vested, a boolean in the dictionary is flipped, sig-
nalling that the traffic sniffing process needs to up-
date the valid knocks it listens to.
– Whenever a new beacon is found, for each command
in the client profile a new valid knock string must
be calculated (per Client Operation 3). Once gener-
ated, each knock string is sent to the listening pro-
cess, using scapy. This listening process acts on the
port number generated per client Operation.
– The listening process, checks each received UDP
packet, of appropriate length, on the correct port,
against the calculated valid knock values. If a match
is found, the relevant command is sought and exe-
cuted.
4.3.6 Discussion
The random port number derived from the beacon serves
two purposes: firstly, it may make the job of an attacker
listening on the wire slightly more difficult, as there is
one less defining traffic characteristic to filter by; sec-
ondly, it improves usability, as the user no longer needs
to memorise the port number to knock against. This
change from Protocol II is made possible by the enor-
mous difference in hash run-times.
5 Evaluation
To begin using Crucible, the client must generate a pro-
file and share this with the server. Figure 2 shows this
process, with the generated profile printed out. The key
is derived from the user’s password using Argon2, as per
Section 4.3.1.
Figure 3 shows typical usage of Crucible. The client
ru s the Python script, passing i the IP, password and
command parameters. There is also an interactive mode
alternative for this operation. The client executes three
commands, “cmd1”, “cmd2” and “cmd2”. As the latter
command has already been executed by the server, it
is ignored for replay protection. These commands will
become available again when a new random beacon is
sourced.
Figure 4, is a traffic capture of traffic emanating
from the client machine as a result of port knocking
with Crucible. It can be seen that Crucible does indeed
only require a single packet for authentication and com-
mand authorisation. Further, the beacon data collected
from the blockchain API is seen to be protected via
HTTPS.
The knock itself, as seen in Figure 5 is a single
512-bit BLAKE2 hash sent via UDP, both the payload
contents and the destination UDP ports are pseudo-
randomly derived, the source port is ephemeral and
chosen by the client OS.
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Fig. 2: Crucible setup: generating a client profile.
Fig. 3: Normal client and server operations of Crucible.
Figure 6 demonstrates how Crucible avoids the NAT
problems faced by port knocking solutions. This prob-
lem arises if a port knocking client attempts to authen-
ticate with a server whose IP address has been trans-
lated, for example, by NAT [59], proxies, or a VPN [6].
As a result, the knock packet sent by the client will
not reach the intended destination. In such a scenario,
Crucible should be installed on each intermediary host,
and is set-up with a command to spawn a new client
process, and knock on the next host in the chain, until
the command reaches its final destination.
5.1 Attack Modelling
In this section a range of potential attacks against the
operations of Crucible are considered, exploring what
capabilities an adversary may have, and what the ram-
ifications of each attack are. [34] outlines the goals of
attack modelling, which are paraphrased as follows:
– To help set requirements for future protocol design.
– To provide users guidelines on whether a protocol
will be safe to use in their environment.
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Fig. 4: Wireshark traffic capture of the client knocking process
– Packets 10-12 show the client’s DNS request for the Blockchain API’s IP.
– Packets 12-24, and 28-29 show the random beacon retrieval over HTTPS.
– Packet 26 is the client knock.
– Packet 27 is a closed-port ICMP reply, per RFC 792 [58].
Fig. 5: Wireshark traffic capture of the client knock.
– To provide clues for analysts keen to find weaknesses
in the protocol, as part of the security process, so
they can determine whether a given attack is valid.
Unless otherwise specified, the attack assumptions this
section operates under are that the attacker is posi-
tioned per Figure 7. This simple diagram may seem
pointless to include, but it helps formalise firstly that
all networks Crucible operates across are considered un-
trusted. Secondly, the diagram highlights the potential
extent of attacker capabilities under a worst-case sce-
nario – full traffic access, and interdiction.
5.1.1 Attacks on Identification Protocols
[22] outlines a range of attacks that can be mounted
against identification protocols, here they are reviewed
in the context of Crucible:
– “impersonation”: an attacker impersonating the client
will only be able to authenticate against the server
with use of the password. The beacon service is
open-access, and would not suffer an attacker imi-
tating the client or server. Impersonating the server,
for example in a man in the middle scenario, could
grant an attacker access to knocks, and could pre-
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Fig. 6: Routing Crucible commands through intermediary hosts
Fig. 7: Attacker positioning context.
vent them reaching the legitimate server. From ob-
tained knocks, there is arguably little an attacker
could gain, as reversing the hash functions is in-
tractable by design. If a knock value has already
been issued, there is little to be gained from an at-
tacker intercepting and relaying it themselves. Im-
personation of the beacon, owing to HTTPS authen-
tication via public key infrastructure, is assumed to
be difficult.
– “replay attack”: If a beacon value were replayed to
the server, an attacker would have the opportunity
to replay commands the client had already issued. If
a beacon value was replayed to the client alone, the
server would not accept that client’s knocks. Both
scenarios represent threats and illustrate the trust
required in the beacon service, and its secure access.
As the server is silent, only replay attacks seemingly
sent from the client require further consideration,
which are actively defended against per Figure 3.
– “interleaving attack: an impersonation or other de-
ception involving selective combination of informa-
tion from one or more previous or simultaneously
ongoing protocol executions.” Interleaving attacks
don’t appear applicable here as the protocol has
little interactivity. Further information on such at-
tacks can be found in [60].
– “ reflection attack: an interleaving attack involving
sending information from an ongoing protocol exe-
cution back to the originator of such information.”
See interleaving attacks.
– “forced delay”: without a beacon, neither client nor
server can operate port knocking functions. Delay-
ing port knocks from client to server could make
them stale, and therefore unacceptable.
– “chosen-text attack: [...] an adversary strategically
chooses challenges in an attempt to extract infor-
mation about the claimant’s long-term key.” Imper-
sonating the beacon, an attacker could try to send
a message to recover the key through examination
of the resulting knocks, though this would require
subversion of the BLAKE2 hash function, which is
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both keyed, and invoked twice in the production of
a knock value. It is unclear to the author how such
an attack would be approached, and seemingly in-
feasible.
From the attacks discussed, most would require man-
in-the-middle capabilities of an attacker. Impersonation
of the beacon service for use in replay of a beacon, or
chosen-beacon attacks, represent the only threats sub-
stantially different from an attacker with the capabil-
ity to physically tamper with the network cable, caus-
ing delay or loss of service. This sort of impersonation
could be carried out if an attacker had compromised
the API’s service, or if the requests made to the API
via HTTPS were not sufficiently secured. If Bitcoin
itself were manipulated, in order to influence beacon
values, this should be considered in the same context
as an attacker impersonating the beacon service. [38],
and [61] provide cost estimates for such an attack in the
thousands of dollars. The chosen block outcome would
further need to circumvent double-invocation of keyed
BLAKE2.
5.1.2 Online Attacks against the Listening Service
The scapy interface for lower-level libpcap functional-
ity could provide adversaries an attack vector for Cru-
cible. Indeed, the libpcap is not without historical vul-
nerabilities [62] and applications of libpcap, such as
Wireshark, have experienced vulnerabilities as a result
of this [63]. As noted previously, Crucible requires root
permissions (for its raw packet access), and an exploita-
tion of libpcap or scapy could have dire consequences.
The listening service itself could also be vulnerable to a
denial of service attack, as is the case for IDPS devices,
where an attacker may send large volumes of traffic,
sometimes anomalous in nature, “ to attempt to ex-
haust a sensor’s resources or cause it to crash” [64].
For Crucible, with its fail closed stance, this would pre-
vent client from authenticating until the service was
restarted.
5.1.3 Offline Attacks against Passwords
In Crucible, the Argon2 hash is used as the key for
BLAKE2, and this hash is retained on the server to au-
thenticate clients. Should the server be compromised,
and if its hash values are stolen and cracked (i.e. the
passwords were discovered) an attacker could use these
credentials to log into other client accounts, elsewhere.
Password cracking is generally the process of inverting
a given hash Hi, by discovering the password such that
H(password) = Hi. This involves generating a great
deal of passwords, hashing each, and comparing the re-
sults against the obtained hash to find a match.
If the password supplied to Argon2 is not of suffi-
cient length, bruteforce attacks are made easier for an
adversary, as there is less keyspace to search. Similarly,
if the password is weakened by using predictable values
(words, numbers, patterns etc.) then this makes dic-
tionary attacks easier to mount. Further, the Argon2
hash is derived using a static salt value, meaning if fu-
ture development added capability for multiple users,
then the hashes derived from these passwords would be
vulnerable to rainbow table attacks, whereby a single
H(password) can be tested against all of the server’s
user hashes. This could be solved by having the user
remember a salt value (or username=salt), or by in-
cluding a client state required for knocking, neither of
which are preferable solutions. The key point, noted
in (4.3.1), is that Argon’s settings parametrise the dif-
ficulty for calculating a hash, making authentication
slightly more slow for users, but dramatically increas-
ing the cost to adversaries of mounting bruteforce or
dictionary attacks.
5.1.4 Attacks against Dependencies
Library and package dependencies are important in the
context of secure protocol design, because external code
vulnerabilities can result in exploitation of the proto-
type itself. As discussed earlier in Section 3.3.1, a NIST
elliptic curve cryptographic standard was allegedly back-
doored. [65] is a more recent example of a Python mod-
ule for handling SSH connections, which surreptitiously
harvested and exfiltrated the user’s SSH credentials.
Javascript library BrowseAloud was recently compro-
mised, resulting in infection of websites using the li-
brary with cryptojacking software; repurposing their
machines as crypto-miners [66]. For transparency, Cru-
cible’s dependencies are included here in Table 2, and
their use should be properly reviewed before deploy-
ment in a production environment. Once deployed, the
libraries need to be constantly updated, and periodi-
cally checked against vulnerability databases.
Table 2: Dependencies in the Crucible prototype.
socket getpass Argon2 pyblake2 sys multiprocessing time os scapy
Client X X X X X
Server X X X X X X
3rd party? X X X
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5.1.5 Reconnaissance and stealth
Reconnaissance encompasses the methods an adversary
can deploy in information gathering at the start of a
campaign. The level of stealth a port knocking imple-
mentation provides may determine whether or not it
is detected by an attacker conducting reconnaissance,
and therefore stealth can decrease the likelihood that a
port knocking server is exploited. An attacker perform-
ing reconnaissance activities could benefit from the fol-
lowing information, all of which could be made possible
through detection of port knocking:
– Identification of a host as a client, server, or beacon
service.
– Detection of a port knocking service on a server.
– Identification of the services hidden or protected by
port knocking.
– Identification of the port knocking implementation
i.e. Crucible.
There are a number of characteristics that could
indicate port knocking from captured traffic between
client, server and beacon. Assuming an attacker had
access to Crucible’s documentation and code, passive
methods of traffic analysis could look for indications
such as:
– Periodic requests to the beacon service. These could
be cross referenced with the beacon API to match a
new block with a spike in HTTPS data transfer. If
using the default API, an attacker could perform a
reverse lookup to the API’s URL and identify Cru-
cible traffic this way.
– UDP packets with 512-bit payloads, where the des-
tination port always differs. Other features of the
knock packet may be identifiable, a number of tech-
niques for passive fingerprinting of traffic are ex-
plored by [67]. Higher amounts of UDP traffic than
expected may contradict stealth goals [68].
– Identifiable traffic resulting from a port knocking
authorised command. For example, if the command
was to open a port, an attacker could periodically
diff open port scans of the server, and identify suc-
cessful knocking traffic.
[69] explores active methods an attacker can use to
identify use of promiscuous mode by a NIC on the local
network, which is active when Crucible is running. One
such method involves crafting an ARP packet, which
would normally be rejected by the NIC, however in
promiscuous mode the host issues no such reply. As
seen in Figure 8, the Nmap sniffer-detect (Nmap is
a popular network sniffing tool) script performs this and
other checks, and may allow an attacker to distinguish
between Crucible and other port knocking solutions.
Fig. 8: Indication of a Crucible server: promiscuous
mode NIC
Greater discussion on stealth aspects of port knock-
ing is reviewed in [6], [70] and [71]. In comparison with
other solutions examined in Section 2.1 on port knock-
ing mechanics, Crucible has the following overall ad-
vantages and disadvantages in stealth:
– With only a single packet sent to the server for
the knock, proportionally less traffic on the wire is
attributable to Crucible than other solutions with
more client-server interactivity.
– No indication of the command executed on the server
should be identifiable from the wire, as replay pro-
tection is enforced (no command will be re-issued),
and as the command name is masked by keyed hash-
ing. The definition of a keyed hash in Section 3.2.2
explains why the command is not recoverable from
traffic. No client identifiers such as IP addresses or
usernames are recoverable from network traffic, nor
are service identifiers such as the service destina-
tion port. Very little information is leaked: between
client and server, the only traffic exchanged is a sin-
gle datagram with a pseudo-random number as its
payload.
– A single UDP datagram containing a random num-
ber may look suspicious in a given context, Crucible
makes no effort to deploy steganography, or other
methods, to appear innocuous to an attacker.
– As a multi-party solution using a random beacon
service, Crucible is more easily detected.
6 Conclusion
Zero knowledge proofs were introduced for private, lightweight
client-identification. Chaos-based cryptography was ex-
plored for the purpose of minimalist, dependency-free
cryptographic hashing. Random beacons were used to
secure replay protection while preserving a single-packet
knock, and preventing attacker-chosen computation. This
paper has explored novel combinations of these topics
with regards to port knocking and has used these ideas
to develop Crucible.
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Crucible achieves command authorisation using a
single packet between client and server, with a payload
likely indistinguishable from a random number. Cru-
cible’s design is minimalist, secure and stateless. It is
portable, and the user only needs to memorise an IP, a
password, and a command name in order to authenti-
cate. Crucible does not authenticate post-knock traffic
(see [11]) and a single command can only be executed
once within the period of a random beacon, though an
unlimited number of unique commands can be run in
this window. Lastly, trust must be placed in the random
beacon service, which is a non-trivial consideration.
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Appendix
Protocol 1 Schnorr Identification Protocol
Protocol setup
– Let p and q be two large primes where p−1 is a mul-
tiple of q. Let Gq denote the subgroup of Z∗p of prime
order q, and g be a generator for the subgroup.
– Let a be the private exponent chosen uniformly at
random from [0, q − 1].Let A = ga mod p.
– Ahead of execution, both prover and verifier know
(p, q, g,G,A).
Protocol actions
1. Prover chooses a number v uniformly at random
from [0, q − 1] and computes V = gv mod p and
sends this to the Verifier.
2. Verifier chooses a challenge c uniformly at random
from [0, 2t−1], where t is the bit length of the chal-
lenge, and sends this to the prover.
3. Prover computes r = v − ac mod q and sends this
to the Verifier.
4. Verifier ensures:
(a) A is within [2, p− 1]
(b) Aq = 1 mod p
(c) V = grAc mod p
5. Protocol messages
Prover → Verifier: V = gv mod p (1)
Prover ← Verifier: c (2)
Prover → Verifier: r = v − ac mod q (3)
Notes
The protocol proves knowledge of the secret exponent
a without revealing any information about it. Setup
parameters may be chosen as per DSA choices. Checks
4(a) and (b) are to avoid invalid public keys. Check
4(c), since:
grAc = (gv−ac)(ga)c = g(v−ac+ac) = gv = V mod p.
This protocol is referenced from [26], Section 2.2.
Protocol 2 Schnorr Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge
Proof
Protocol setup
– Let p and q be two large primes where p−1 is a mul-
tiple of q. Let Gq denote the subgroup of Z∗p of prime
order q, and g be a generator for the subgroup.
– Let a be the private exponent chosen uniformly at
random from [0, q−1]. Let A = ga mod p be public
key associated with a.
– LetH be a secure cryptographic hash function,UserID
a unique identifier for the Prover, and OtherInfo op-
tional data. The bit length of the hash output should
be at least equal to that of the order q of the con-
sidered subgroup.
– Ahead of execution, both prover and verifier know
(p, q, g,G,A,H,UserID).
Protocol actions
1. Prover chooses a number v uniformly at random
from [0, q − 1] and computes the following:
(a) V = gv mod p.
(b) c = H (g‖V ‖A‖UserID‖OtherInfo)
(c) r = v − ac mod q.
2. Prover sends (UserID,OtherInfo, c, r) to Verifier.
3. Verifier uses the provided UserID to lookup A.
4. Verifier computes V = grAc.
5. Verifier ensures c ?= H (g‖V ‖A‖UserID‖OtherInfo).
Protocol 3 Absolute Value Chaos-based Cryptographic
Hash Function
Inputs
– A message string M of arbitrary length.
– A key K used as the initial value of the chaotic
map. Chosen as a long floating number of 128-bit
precision, and associated keyspace.
– A fixed number of map iterations i.
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– A chosen range for the α coefficient to introduce
chaos into the absolute value map, as seen in Equa-
tion (2).
Process
1. The message is padded with the ASCII character
’0’ ASCII appended to the suffix, until the message
length in bytes is a multiple of 8.
2. The messageM is split into an L-sized array of bytes
ωi for i = 1 . . . L. Each byte element uses the ASCII
integer value for the associated string character in
M .
3. With key K substituting for ω0 as the initialisation
value, each ωi is iterated through the chaotic map
i-times: xn+1 = 1−ABS((0.0015ωm + 1.8)xn)
4. This is repeated for the next ωm+1, using the previ-
ous xi as the initialisation value ω0, until each byte
of the original message has been combined into xL
the last value.
5. The final value produced by the chaotic map xL is
normalised into a long number in the range 0 ≤
H(M) < 2128 as the message digest.
Notes In step (3) the α value is equal to 0.0015ωi+
1.8, this is because each ωi is an integer ASCII value
between 32 and 126, so these values are normalised onto
the chosen range of 1.8 ≤ α < 2 for the required chaotic
behaviour. This protocol is referenced from [35] with
modification to the α parameter.
Protocol 4 Bitcoin Random Beacon
Inputs
– Secure cryptographic hash function H(m, k), here
the chaos-based keyed hash function from earlier is
used, with key k for message m.
– Block header BH and block header hash BHH of
the Bitcoin network’s most recent block, polled from
a Bitcoin tracking website (a blockchain API) by
through a HTTPS request.
Process
1. Pull down the block header BH and the hash of the
block header BHH from the website.
2. Calculate the binary OR of the header and the block
header hash, b = BH +BHH
3. Output H(b, k)
Notes
This protocol is referenced from the implementation
by [50] of the Bitcoin Random Beacon proposed in [38],
with the following modifications:
Check is performed to validate the block header hash
received from the website, this is to avoid importing li-
braries for calculating SHA hashes used in Bitcoin.
[50] chose a HMAC construction using SHA-256, in-
stead the chaotic keyed hash from 3.2.3 is used. The
block header hash is included to strengthen against ma-
licious miners aiming to influence the block header.
Even if the header were tampered with, the resulting
hash value of this header remains unpredictable.
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